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The people who gave the world the written constitution seem to
have forgotten how to write whole constitutions or to have lost the will
to try. We Americans write amendments. We certainly engage in
interpretation and reinterpretation. And we'll give somebody else a hand,
if they're trying to write a constitution for somewhere else. In fact, this
has recently become a booming cottage industry. But really new
constitutions for ourselves? Not us. Not here. Not now.
I.

CONVENTIONPHOBIA AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Though calls for a national constitutional convention, often to
achieve some specific goal, have been relatively frequent, we have not
created an opportunity for partial or full reconsideration of the U.S.
constitution by a group convened for this purpose since the "Miracle at
Philadelphia" over two centuries ago.' Alternative constitutions have
occasionally been drafted and published. But they generally have been
dismissed as oddities, good stuff for scholarly musings, but not suitable
for the attention of serious persons of affairs.2 In recent years the mere
prospect of a national constitutional convention even for a limited
purpose (for example, to adopt a balanced budget amendment) provoked
outraged resistance ;from judges, law professors and even presidents.
"The most awful thing in the world," Supreme Court Justice William
Brennan called it. "Constitutional Brinkmanship," constitutional law

1. See generally, CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966).
2. REXFORD TUGWELL, MODEL FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (1970).
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expert Gerald Gunther said. 3 ". . . [V]ery ill advised and contrary to the
best interest of our country," remarked President Jimmy Carter.4
Experts and politicians are not the only Americans who are
conventionphobic. In 1995, two governors, Democrat E. Benjamin
Nelson of Nebraska and Republican Mike Levitt of Utah, sought
resolutions from state legislatures in support of a "Conference of the
States." Their plan was to maximize state clout on hot current issues in
federalism by providing a visible national forum for position-taking for
the governors and bipartisan delegations of six legislators from each
state. Fifteen states acted in support, but then the plan came under attack
from conservative groups and radio talk show hosts. They saw in it the
potential for a "runaway" constitutional convention that might, for
example, repeal the right to bear arms in the second amendment. They
turned up the heat, and state legislative support evaporated.
All constitutions must face the question of how they may be
changed or replaced. One common approach is to use existing governmental institutions to propose change, but with special rules - for
example, extraordinary majorities and/or double passage requirements.
Thus the U.S. constitution provides that amendments may be proposed
by two thirds majorities in both houses of Congress.
But what if those in power resist a needed or desired change out of
self-interest? As George Mason of Virginia remarked at the Constitutional Convention: "It would be improper to require the consent of the
National Legislature, because they may abuse their power and refuse
their consent on that very account. '
Most constitutions anticipate this special problem by providing in
their amending clauses for a second method for proposing changes, one
that bypasses incumbent politicians and continuing institutions entirely.
This is done in the states by use of the constitutional initiative, the
automatic convention call, or (in Florida) the independent commission
with direct access to the people. In the U.S. constitution this is done by
the requirement - the word "shall" is used in Article V - that Congress
call a special deliberative assembly to make changes in the basic

3. Gunther, ConstitutionalBrinkmanship; Stumbling Towards a Convention, A.B.A. J.Vol.
65. (1979) p. 1046; Brennan (quoted in RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP, viii,
(1982).
4. Quoted in Frank J. Sorauf, The Political Potential of an Amending Convention, 117,
KERMIT HALL, HAROLD M. HYMAN AND LEON V. SEGAL, EDS., THE CONSTITUITIONAL CONVENTION
AS AN AMENDING DEVICE (1981).
5. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS, 4TH ED., 312, (1991).
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document, a constitutional convention, if two thirds of the state
legislatures make "application" for one.
There is no national constitutional initiative procedure in the United
States constitution. No automatic convention call. No continuing
constitutional commission that can bypass the legislature. Thus if the
constitutional convention procedure is unused, then as a practical matter
the national constitution may be changed only with the consent of
extraordinary majorities of those in power in both houses of Congress,
the intent of the Founders notwithstanding. Or stated differently, national
constitutional change can be blocked by one more than one third of the
members of either house, currently 34 Senators or 146 Representatives.
The difficulty of altering the United States Constitution as a result
of Congressional initiative has been widely noted. This is not only
because proposal requires extraordinary majorities in both legislative
houses, but also because of ratification requirements. Whatever method
is used to propose amendments, to be finally implemented they must
obtain support in three-quarters of the state legislatures or, if Congress
chooses (as it did once for the 21st amendment repealing prohibition), in
ratifying conventions in the same portion of the states.
Note that ratification procedures are entirely outside of the national
political institutions established by the constitution. Note also that, unlike
in all the states but Delaware, they require no return to the people, the
ultimate source of political authority and legitimacy in a democracy.
These ratification processes are federal, built on an equal role for states,
whatever their size.
In the nation's first two hundred years, well over 9,000 constitutional amendments were introduced in Congress, more than 3,000 of these
in the last third of a century. Twenty-six passed. Amendments that were
given serious consideration in recent years but failed to pass touched
such nerve-end subjects as abortion, school bussing, school prayer, and
flag burning. Others that came close called for a balanced budget and
direct election of president. Seven amendments that passed Congress
failed of ratification, most recently the Equal Rights Amendment and one
passed in 61978 giving the District of Columbia voting representation in
Congress.
When it comes to adding to or altering the language of the
constitution, Congress is prudent about protecting its defacto monopoly. The threat of calling a constitutional convention has several times

6. Id. at 315-316.
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motivated serious congressional consideration of possible amendments.
A mounting number of state petitions for a convention to require direct
popular election of U.S. Senators forced the 17th amendment out of a
reluctant Senate, where it had long languished. Petition campaigns
preceded passage of amendments repealing prohibition (21st), limiting
the president's term (22nd), and providing for presidential disability
(25th). In the early 1980's, as the number of states calling for a
convention on the subject passed 30, Congress took up a balanced budget
amendment.7
Congress's control, however, is not plenary. Constitutional change
also occurs through judicial interpretation (a very large subject that will
not be explored in detail here). This is the reason Woodrow Wilson,
while he was still a political science professor, described the U.S.
Supreme Court as a "continuing constitutional convention." Recently, for
example, attention has focused on the Supreme Court's renewed interest
in the federal balance struck in the constitution, as witnessed by its five
to four decisions finding limits on the expansion of federal power
through the commerce clause in the Lopez case, but denying state
authority to limit length of service in the national legislature. 8 The fact
that court interpretation has become the easiest means of gaining
constitutional change is probably part of the reason that battles over
federal judicial nominations have lately become so fierce.

H. THE NATIONAL ARGUMENT
Constitutional conventionphobia at the national level has three
rationales. The first is that the territory is entirely uncharted. The second
is that the constitution is important not only for its content, but also as
a key symbolic source of national unity. The third is that single-function,
federally based deliberative devices are inapposite for important decision
making in modem American politics.
A.

UNCHARTED TERRITORY.

The current constitution's amending clause, Article V, provides only
that a convention "shall" be called "on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States." It provides no standard to

7. Clement Vose, Constitutional Change, in Sorauf, supra note 4, at 115.
8. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, and
Arkansas v. Hill 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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determine the validity of the states' action. There is no guidance as to
whether a state can later change its mind about whether it wants a
convention. Congress's discretion in calling a convention is undefined.
It does not specify a basis of representation. It does not discuss means
of delegate selection. And most important, it provides no method for
limiting the reach of such a Convention, once it is convened.9
All this breeds uncertainty. And uncertainty in turn produces fear,
fear of a "runaway" convention. Though most state calls for a national
convention seek to limit its agenda, experts express great skepticism
concerning the authority of Congress by statute or the states in their
convention calls to constrain a convention empowered to alter that
constitution itself."0 The result might therefore be " ...
unlimited
amendments which would change the basic thrust, the philosophy and the
structure of our government," President Carter concluded."
Certainly historic precedent offers no comfort in this area. After all,
a convention that exceeded its mandate happened once before ... in
1787.
In the late 1960's, encouraged by Senator Everett Dirksen of
Illinois, the number of states petitioning Congress for a convention to
overturn the U.S. Supreme Court's one-person-one-vote rulings
approached two-thirds. Prospects for similar movements on other matters
loomed. In reaction the Senate sought to reduce uncertainty by twice
passing legislation, sponsored by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina,
that limited the work of any convention to the subject of valid state
applications, established standards to determine validity, apportioned to
states the same representation at any convention that each had in the
Electoral College, and defined procedures for transmission of amend-

9. The major focus of debate has been on the authority of Congress to limit the scope of a
national constitutional convention. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution:A Letter
to a Congressman, 82 YALE L. J. 189 - 215 (1972); American Bar Association, Special
Constitutional Convention Study Committee. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V (Chicago: ABA, 1974); Walter E. Dellinger, The
RecurringQuestion of the "Limited" ConstitutionalConvention, 88 YALE L. J. 1623 - 1306 (1979);

The Limited Constitutional Convention - The Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L. J. 985 - 1001
(1979).
10. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION AcT #1 98th Congress, IstSession (See also same title, 99th
Congress, 1st. Session); U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. IS
THERE ACONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN AMERICA'S FUTURE? Committee. Print. Serial #1. 103rd
Congress, 1st Session.
11. Sorauf, supra note 4, at 117.
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ments to the states and their ratification.' 2 When the number of states
calling for a constitutional convention to consider a balanced budget
amendment approached two thirds in the late 1970's and early 1980's,
the Senate Judiciary Committee considered such legislation again, and
once reported it unanimously.
On all these occasions the House took no action. Its philosophy
seemed to be that reducing uncertainty would simply encourage
convention advocates. A convention might occur. And once the dam was
broken, Congress might permanently lose control of the amending
process. "Anything that encourages this sort of use of Article V is
unwise," said Congressman Don Edwards of California, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
3

Rights.'

If problems are severe enough, lack of experience with a process
that might provide solutions is not by itself a sufficiently compelling
reason to avoid it. There are severe problems with the national government. Trust and confidence in it have waned. Most citizens believe that
leaders don't care what they think. Participation levels are low.
Perennially imbalanced budgets, big-money politics, careerism in public
office, government gridlock, all these have called forth proposals for
constitutional change. But when combined with the absence of rules,
procedures and limits - and with very severe questions about our
institutional capacity to make any rules we make actually stick - the
risks of an untested constitutional convention process to deal with these
problems are likely to weigh more heavily than the potential gains, from
almost any ideological perspective.
A national constitutional convention might limit its own agenda or
might accept limits imposed by Congress or the states. Or it might not,
and go on to actually produce a result. Before the smoke has cleared,
basic rights might be redefined, the government in Washington fundamentally restructured, intergovernmental relations reordered, and
centuries of law and precedent brought into question. All depends on
who gets to participate and the processes used for reaching decisions.
Litigation might ensue on convention processes and results. But
what would be the authority of courts created on constitutional authority
to decide on actions of a convention? Uncertainty again.
Finally, given the diversity of modem American society, the time

12. Sorauf, supra note 4, at 117-23.
13. Sorauf, supra note 4, at 122.
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that a national convention and ratification process would require, and the
rules under which we've become accustomed to functioning - remember,
the 1787 convention was a CLOSED meeting - there is a very real
prospect that there would be no usable result from a national constitutional convention. The broader the changes made the smaller the
likelihood that ratification would occur by three quarters of the state
legislatures or, if Congress chooses, state level ratifying conventions. A
"Much Ado About Nothing" is far from impossible. Such an outcome
would further undermine confidence in the governmental system's
capacity to address its most fundamental problems.
B.

THE SACRED SYMBOL.

Consideration of the way we display the original constitution at the
National Archives in Washington signals a second reason why a national
convention is resisted. The setting is a shrine of our civil religion. The
original constitution, now a sacred relic hydraulically lowered into a
fifty-five ton bombproof vault deep in the ground to secure it from
damage during a possible nuclear attack (a precaution of the 1950's) is
displayed during fixed times on a raised platform. It is in a sealed helium
and water vapor filled environment, under two levels of glass. Constant
surveillance is maintained with space age cameras. During designated
visiting times, enormous decorated steel doors are rolled back to admit
the public. Under the eyes of security guards, velvet ropes guide more
than a million curious and interested people a year along the sides of the
room, up onto the platform for a quick viewing, and then down the other
side.
In contrast with most writers on civil religion in America, Sanford
Levinson rightly observes that religion has over the course of history
".. .served much more as a source of deep cleavage than of unity."' 4
He therefore raises questions about the integrative effect of America's
civil religion and its icons, the Declaration of Independence, the Flag,
and the Constitution. 5 But these religious divisions are about differences of belief and interpretation, that is, about the meaning of the symbols
rather than the symbols as physical objects. The objects themselves
remain unifying, at least so long as they retain a connectedness with what

14.

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, 16 (1988).

15. See Irving Kristol, The Spirit of '87, PUBLIC INTEREST No. 86, 5 (1987). The intensity of
the debate about a constitutional amendment barring flag burning may be explained in part by the
clash it implicitly contains between two of the three most fundamental national symbols.
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and are free of identity with a specific faction, cause or
they symbolize,
6
1

sect.

A national constitutional convention is threatening to the very utility
of the physical object, the relic, as a symbol of national continuity. The
adoption of a substantially new constitution would render the original of
the old one a curiosity, the "first constitution" now replaced. It would no
longer be THE constitution, the oldest written basic document in continuous use in the world.
Our centuries old written constitution-as-symbol is a force that binds
an increasingly polyglot nation in a time when the preservation of the
United States may be more than a casual concern. "The constitution for
a society like ours, which really has no nationality," Brown University
historian Robert Wood observed, "became so important to our sense of
people, that to tamper with it was to tamper
ourselves as being a single
7
with the nation itself."'
The twenty-first century will raise questions of "scale" that will
challenge the large nation state. People in every comer of the globe of
common ethnic background are exhibiting an enormous drive to live in
their own nations, however small. At the same time, economic activity
is increasingly organized on a world-wide basis. Europeans may
demonstrate that political integration is no longer required before
economic integration. Decentralizing tendencies in large democracies are
everywhere apparent. In these circumstances it is far from foolish for
Americans to value the constitution and its continuity as one of the few
reinforcing symbols of our common nationhood, and therefore to abjure
a national constitutional convention.
C.

INAPPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTS FOR CHANGE.

Interestingly, the U.S. constitution relies on two other singlefunction deliberative devices to deal with important matters the founders
thought inappropriate to place in the hands of the governmental
institutions they created in the U.S. constitution. Both, like the constitutional convention, have a federal character. Both too have fallen into
desuetude. One is state ratifyring conventions for constitutional amend-

16. Thus the "capture" of the flag as a symbol by the right during the Vietnam war threatened
to diminish its power as a national symbol. Ambiguities about the unifying value of the flag persist,
and can be seen in the flag burning debate. In contrast, these are not evident in the constitution as
object, perhaps because many who accept it as a symbol are unfamiliar with its contents.
17. Kermit L. Hall, et. al. 59 (1981).
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ments. The other is the Electoral College for the selection of the
president and vice president. As noted above, state ratifying conventions
were used only once. And of course the Electoral College has long since
lost any of the deliberative character that might have been intended for
it and, as also noted, has itself been the object of major efforts at
constitutional amendment.
Specialized deliberative assemblies have also fallen into disuse in
our most important extra-constitutional political institutions, the major
political parties. Direct primaries have been ascendant for almost half a
century. No state has relied exclusively on a convention since 1955.
Nominating conventions for statewide office remain important in only a
handful of states. I" And at the national level, conventions have become
only sightly more than choreographed media shows, a place where the
selection of the presidential candidate is ratified and his campaign
launched before a nationwide television audience. 19
These developments have led observers to conclude that such singlepurpose deliberative bodies are an anachronism in modem, nationalized
American politics. "[A] series of decisions independently made parochially made, really, in some cases - by the separate states seems to
be adding up to something that has no national deliberation or national
discussion," Gordon Wood remarked at a conference on Article V in
1981. "And that runs so counter to the way in which we have
come to
20
conduct our national business that we are frightened by it."
II.

CONVENTIONS AND AMENDMENT IN THE STATES

In a recent essay Wesley Horton, the attorney in Connecticut's
landmark school finance case, noted that both the U.S. Constitution and
the constitution of his state had been amended twenty-six times ... but
in the first instance it took over two hundred years, while in the second
less than thirty. "Amending the United States Constitution is a nightmare," Horton wrote. "Amending the Connecticut Constitution is a
breeze."'5
There have been 234 constitutional conventions in American states,
territories and the District of Columbia. The states have functioned under

18.

See MALCOLM JEWELL AND DAVID M. OLSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN

AMERICAN STATES 3rd. ed., chapter 4 (1988).
19. ROBERT B. DISHMAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT, (1960).
20. Hall, et. al., 156 (1981). See also the remarks of Frank Soraufsupranote 4, at 126.
21. Memoirs of a Connecticut School Finance Lawyer, 26 CONN. L. R. 709 n.14 (Spring,
1992).
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146 separate constitutions. In the eight years between 1986 and 1993,
1007 amendments were offered to documents currently in force. Of these,
708 passed.22
There are at least five sets of reasons that constitutional conventions
are more common and amendments more frequent at the state level.
A.

No SYMBOLS HERE.

First, state constitutions lack symbolic importance. Before there was
a national constitution, legal historian Lawrence Friedman has written,
state constitutions were" ... a rallying point, a symbol of unity during
war.' 23 When Tocqueville travelled
the ... [revolutionary] ...
America, early in 1831, he observed that "Patriotism... [was] ... still
There is a tendency of the ... people," he
directed to the state ....
activity in the states in preference to the
political
wrote, "to center
24
Union."
The civil war preserved the union, and marked the moment of
ascendence for national over state identity. Then there was another
century and a third of growth and massive social and economic change economic integration, immigration and internal migration. The south got
its first post-civil war U.S. president in 1964, a final confirmation of full
political integration in the nation. There are still state flags and other
symbols, but few citizens know what they are, just as relatively few 44% in a 1989 survey - know that there are state constitutions.2 5 The
state constitution lacks symbolic power because the function it may
perform as a political symbol has been rendered irrelevant over more
than one hundred years of history. And documents that lack symbolic
power are easier to change.
B.

PRACTICE, PRACTICE.

Second, states started fast and kept in practice. Georgia, South
Carolina and Vermont each had three constitutions before 1800.
Kentucky, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania had two. A constitution,

22. Janice May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1992-93. BOOK OF THE
STATES 1993-94,4 and Table 1.1, 19 (1994). The total for conventions includes the one held in the
District of Columbia in 1982 and that called for 1994 in the Northern Marianas Commonwealth.
23. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 2nd. ed., 116 (1985).
24. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA, 386 (1945).
25. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutions in the

FederalSystem: Selected Opportunitiesfor State Initiatives, 17 ACIR BuLLETIN 2 (July, 1989).
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and forum to create it, was required as each new state entered the union.
At different times during the first half of the nineteenth century, both the
advocates for democracy and those who sought to limit its excesses
calculated the potential risks of state level constitutional conventions far
less than the probable gains. In addition to the three named above, fifteen
states had at least two constitutions by 1850. Thus almost 60% of the
states then in the union had experience with conventions and large scale
constitutional change by the eve of the civil war.
The experience of the south with overall constitutional change is
especially rich, reflecting the effect of massive political trauma. Fourteen
southern and border states adopted thirty-seven constitutions (one quarter
of the total adopted in all states over all of U.S. history) between the
beginning of the civil war and the close of reconstruction. Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia and Texas each were governed under four
different state constitutions during this period.
Outside the south after the civil war, and then later in the south as
well, the impulse to change the fundamentals of state government
through conventions came in waves, each with different goals: immediately after the civil war, to limit legislatures; in the populist era, to
advance direct democracy and limit big business; early in this century,
to create executive-centered governments modeled on the private
corporation; and most recently, in the 1960's and 1970's, to modernize
and professionalize legislatures and state government generally. In each
era, leaders were able to draw on the history of conventions, established
early and employed without cataclysmic effect; and on the crest of great
movements for change, they could overcome resistant political forces.
Experience in the states with conventions means that there are or
have been rules for calling, staffing and convening them in the state law
or in the constitution itself (though "ancient history" tends to be
discounted in the decision-making process). There are also records of
fights about rules and their possible consequences, and outcomes that
provide real evidence of consequences. This reduces the mystery that
surrounds the relatively rare single-function forum that is a convention.
The capacity in some states to limit a convention's agenda in the
convention call approved by the voters is another factor that may
significantly reduce the perceived risks connected with holding one. As
further detailed below, between 1938 and 1968, conventions with limited
agendas were held in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee
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and Virginia.26
C.

EASE OF AMENDMENT.

In some states, but far from all, the formal rules for changing state
constitutions without conventions are easier than for changing the U.S.
constitution. The Florida, Georgia and Oregon legislatures are explicitly
authorized to adopt entirely new constitutions, certainly a sign that this
kind of action is imaginable.
More importantly, about a third of the states, unlike the United
States, have a way to bypass the legislature to change the constitution
that works: the constitutional initiative. (A second way around the
legislature - the constitutional commission with direct access to the ballot
- will be discussed in some detail below.)
1. Through the Legislature.
There are two general means by which legislative initiative of
constitutional change in the states may be made more difficult than the
passage of simple legislation. The first is an extraordinary majority
requirement for both houses (except, of course, in unicameral Nebraska).
The second is passage more than once, often with an election intervening.
Twenty-nine states require extraordinary majorities with single
passage, like the U.S. Constitution does for amendments that are initiated
in Congress. Eleven mandate double passage, but by simple majorities.
And four use both extraordinary majorities and double passage. Nine
states7 use neither; they employ simple majorities and single passage.28
Double passage is the highest hurdle. Intervening elections change
the composition of the legislative bodies. Time allows opposition to
develop. In those states that provide more than one method, the one that
requires single passage is almost exclusively used.29
All states experience more frequent constitutional amendment than

26. ALBERT STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING: 1938-1968, 65-66 (1970).
27. Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutionsand ConstitutionalRevision: 198081 and the Past 50 Years, in BOOK OF THE STATES, 119 (1982).
28. The number totals to more than 50 because the Connecticut, Hawaii and New Jersey
constitutions, like that of the United States, use two methods. The Pennsylvania constitution provides
for a second single-passage method as well, for emergency situations.
29. Gerald Benjamin and Melissa Cusa, Amending the New York State Constitution Through
the Legislature.in GERALD BENJAMIN (ed.), THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING

BOOK, 67 & 69 (1994).
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does the United States. For those states in which the formal processes are
least demanding, amendments are most frequent. But fifteen states have
formal processes for proposing amendments through the legislature that
are more difficult than that in the U.S. constitution, and still alter their
constitution more frequently. Different formal arrangements are clearly
only part of the answer.
2. The ConstitutionalInitiative.
The Constitutional initiative first appeared in Oregon in 1902.
Currently, 18 states give their citizens the right to petition to alter the
state constitution. 0 And where the opportunity is available, it is more
and more being used. Constitutional changes that arrive on the ballot by
the initiative still remain a small portion of all proposals, but the absolute
number and proportion have both risen substantially in recent years.
There were almost twice as many constitutional initiatives in 1992-93
(34) than in 1986-87 (18); the percentage of all proposals reaching the
ballot by the initiative route in the later years was more than double
(14.2%) that of the earlier ones (6.5%).
More important than the number of state constitutional changes
made by this route is the character of these changes, deemed "historic"
by two leading experts on the subject." The constitutional initiative has
brought tax limits to state governments and terms limits to state
legislatures. Currently, 14 states have tax limits, 12 of them constitutional initiative states.32 Term limits for the state legislature have been
imposed in 18 states, all but four of those that have a constitutional
initiative procedure. Clearly the initiative is a means of achieving
constitutional change that can and does fundamentally alter governmental
structures and processes, and therefore power relationships.
To cite just one dramatic example, term limits were adopted in
California partly to break legendary Speaker Willie Brown's grip on the
Assembly, a grip he held even after the Republicans won a bare majority
of the seats in 1995. It worked. With Senate leader Dave Roberti, Brown

30. David Kehler and Robert M. Stem, Initiativesin the 1980's and 1990's, in Council of State
Governments, BOOK OF THE STATES 1994-95, 288, (Lexington, Ky.: The Council, 1994; See
generally, THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY, (1989); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION, (1984).
31. Sturm and May, supra note 27, at 120.
32. Scott Mackey, Remarks to the National Education Association School Finance Seminar,
Atlanta Georgia, May 19, 1994, plus Nevada, adopted in 1994, Revenue and ExpenditureLimits.
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resisted the imposition of limits, and then litigated against them.33 He
lost twice. With his continuation in the Assembly decisively blocked,
Brown ran for one more election as Mayor of San Francisco.
Seeing its effects, citizens in states without the constitutional
initiative procedure are calling for its adoption. Amendments are being
filed in state legislatures, though almost never by real powerholders"
Little wonder that political leaders in states without the constitutional
initiative are vigorously resisting its imposition. Unlike the convention
procedure at the national level, it does what it is designed to do: change
the fundamentals of government without the consent or participation of
those in power.
3. Ratification.
Except in Delaware, all states require ratification of amendments by
a statewide referendum. A few have minimum vote or geographic
distribution requirements for passage.3 5 Between 1986 and 1993 voters
ratified 73.3% of amendments sent to them by the legislature, and 37.2%
of those placed on the ballot through the initiative.36
The ratification process for U.S. constitutional change is clearly far
more difficult, especially in an era of rapid communication. It requires
action in at least thirty-eight different places, by thirty-eight different
groups of people. And that action is not simultaneous. It may be spread
out over years, even if a deadline is set by Congress, as it was for the
failed ERA and D.C. Representative Voting Rights measures mentioned
earlier. Each state legislature or ratifying convention can therefore know
who has acted earlier, and how many others must act before ratification
occurs. And supporters and opponents from within and outside the state
can concentrate resources and efforts at critical places in critical
37
moments.
D.

THE SUBSTANCE.

State constitutions are often remarked upon, and criticized, for their

33. Charles M. Price, The Guillotine Comes to California, in GERALD BENJAMIN

AND

MICHAEL MALBIN, LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS, 117-138 (1992).

34. Michael Malbin and Gerald Benjamin, Why is There No Real Term Limits Debate in New
York? EMPIRE STATE REPORT, 39-44, (Nov., 1992).
35. Benjamin and Cusa, supra note 29, at 69-70.
36. May, supra note 22, at 1,Table A.
37. On the change process at the national level see Gregory A. Caldiera, ConstitutionalChange
in America: Dynamics of Ratification Under Article V, PUBLIUS, Vol. 15 (Fall, 1985) pp. 29-49.
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"unconstitution-like" length and level of detail. The classic reformist
position, often advocated but rarely achieved, is that the state constitutions should stick to fundamentals and avoid the "prolixity of a legal
code."38
Legal historian Lawrence Freidman has even traced the roots of
"inflated constitutions" to the late eighteenth century, though the
founding era is one in which sticking to basics was thought to prevail.
"Each one reflected the wishes of some faction or interest group, which
tried to make its policies permanent by freezing them into the charter.
Constitutions, like treaties, preserved the terms of the compromise
between warring groups ....
For very delicate issues, the tactics of
constitutionalism appeared essential. Otherwise,
slight changes in political
39
compromise."
the
upset
could
power
Additionally, a theoretical basis exists for state constitutions that are
more extensive than the national document. Plenary governmental power
transferred to the states from the British Crown as a result of revolution.
Thus unlike that of the national government, the states' power is not
"granted in" but is "structured and limited by" their constitutions. Under
the federal arrangement, moreover, the responsibility of states and their
derivative localities for daily governmental functions is very broad in
scope. More detail is required to specify limits on a theoretically
otherwise unlimited sovereign with broad responsibilities than to specify
the limited powers and duties of a national government created from
scratch.4"
Their detailed content is a final reason that state constitutions are
more frequently amended. State policy makers have been enormously
artful about circumventing constitutional provisions designed to limit
them, as even the most casual review of the history of state borrowing
practices demonstrates. And one person's "fundamentals" is another's
"excessive detail." But there is little doubt that constitutional amendment
in the states is more frequent because of the needs that arise from
ordinary policy making. This is one of the reasons such a large
proportion of constitutional changes originate in the legislature, and most

38. The phrase is Chief Justice John Marshall's, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheaton)
316 (1819)(cited in ROBERT B. DISHMAN, STATE CONSTITUrIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT,

29 (1968).
39. Friedman, supra note 23, at 116.
40. Briffault (1994) 9-10,(citing Daniel J. Elazar, The Principlesand Traditions Underlying
State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 11 & 15 (Winter, 1982); G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Porter,
Introduction:State Constitutionsand State ConstitutionalLaw, 17 PUBLIUS 4 (Winter, 1987).
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of these pass at referendum; they are noncontroversial manifestations of
business as usual.
IV. EMERGING CONVENTIONPHOBIA AT THE STATE LEVEL
All this evidence of frequent constitutional change in the states
notwithstanding, there is considerable evidence that conventionphobia is
reaching this level of government. Eighteen states are still functioning
under their original constitutions. Far fewer than half as many conventions have been held in the twentieth century to date (63) than in the
nineteenth (144), and the count for this century includes such non-states
as Puerto Rico and Washington D.C..41
Between 1930 and 1981, of the 47 unlimited convention calls placed
on the ballot 25 were defeated. The constitutions produced by seven
unlimited conventions held during the 1960's and 1970's - in New York,
Rhode Island, Maryland, New Mexico, North Dakota and Arkansas
(twice) - were rejected at the polls. The 1974 unlimited convention in
Texas failed to agree on a proposal at all.4 2
Fourteen state constitutions provide for automatic submission of
ballot questions to the voters, asking if they wish to hold a constitutional
convention as an alternative means of bypassing a potential legislative
roadblock. In the quarter century between 1960 and 1985 automatic
convention calls were approved only in New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and Alaska.43 Many who worked for the creation and adoption of the
new Illinois constitution in 1970 saw no need for a convention when the
next automatic vote arose in 1988. That call was defeated by a 3 to 1
margin. 44 In each of four states that provided for an automatic convention call during the early 1990's-Alaska, New Hampshire, Ohio and
Michigan--majorities have rejected the opportunity. The most recently
adopted state constitution is Georgia's, effected in 1982.
An announcement of the demise of unlimited state constitutional
conventions would be premature.45 But there is certainly a growing
41. Sturm, supra note 26, at 54; May, supra note 22, at 4.
42. Sturm and May, supra note 27, at 121.
43. Janice C. May, ConstitutionalAmendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS 156 n.16
(Winter, 1987). The Alaska convention call was voided by the courts.
44. Janice C. May, State Constitutionsand ConstitutionalRevision: 1988-89 and the 1980's,
in Council of State Governments, BOOK OF THE STATES, 1990-91, 22-23, (Lexington, Ky.: The
Council, 1990).

45. As John Bebout has noted, this error was made in the 1930's, during a hiatus in convention
use. Recent Constitution Writing, 35 TEx. L. R. 1071 (1957), (cited in Robert F. Williams, Are State
ConstitutionalConventions a Thing of the Past?,in this issue of Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium,
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reluctance to employ them. When the prospect of a state convention is
raised, the ensuing public debate is likely to lack subtlety. Appropriate
or not, the arguments against national constitutional change find their
way into it. The distinctions in function and character between state and
national constitutions are blurred or lost on the assumption that the same
arguments must apply to "things" with the same name.
The detail in state constitutions, as much as it attracts change, also
provides a disincentive to the use of conventions, especially unlimited
ones. Groups that have won protections in the past may fear losing them
in new political circumstances, however remote the threat. Indeed, the
prospects of a convention often induces traditionally liberal interests to
take conservative stances.
Environmentalists and teachers in New York are already mobilizing
against the calling of a convention there in 1997, when the automatic
question will be on the ballot. Environmentalists fear alteration of the
"Forever Wild" provision of the state constitution, added in 1894, that
protects the Catskill and Adirondack Preserves. Teachers are concerned
about possible threats to state constitutional guarantees of public
employee pensions and the changes in the specific prohibition in the New
York constitution against public support for parochial education. Interestingly, advocates of parochial education in the state no longer focus on
constitutional change; they have found ways around the constitutional
restrictions. 46
As demonstrated at the national level, multiple amending processes
are interactive, the use or potential use of one bearing upon the
attractiveness of the other. A demonstrated capacity of the state
legislature to make needed constitutional reforms provides powerful
ammunition against the holding of a convention. In 1993 Michigan
amended its constitution to make massive changes in its means of
financing public schools. The next year, the state League of Women
Voters argued against a "yes" vote on the mandatory convention ballot
question. The League said that a convention was unneeded, because
school finance reform proved that " ..... individual elements of the
Constitution - even the most important ones - can be changed by elected
officials and citizens without an open-ended effort at overall constitutional revision."

n.6.
46. See Robert Stone, Education and William Ginsburg, The Environment, in Benjamin 177194, and 221-230 (1994); Thomas Y. Hobart, Jr., Opening Pandora's Box, THE NEW YORK
TEACHER, June 12, 1995.
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Finally there is the argument that conventions are likely to be
dominated by those in the "government industry," the political people
and forces that already control the state government. If this is likely to
be the case, there are two consequences. The pervasive public hostility
to government institutions is automatically extended to conventions. And
conventions become seen as useless for achieving fundamental changes
opposed by those in power. That is, they don't work to do what they are
intended to do. This argument has special force in states in which
partisan election in already defined districts is specified for the election
of convention delegates, as is the case in New York.
Interestingly these last two arguments contradict each other. One
fears too much change in conventions; the other fears too little. Samuel
Huntington's remark that "The American political experience is
distinguished by frequent acts of creation but few, if any, of innovation,"
may be something of an overstatement.47 But the record does show that
conventions rarely make massive change. They alter what is already in
place. They borrow provisions from other states, and from the U.S.
constitution. For fear of generating opposition at ratification for the
changes they wish to make, they are often respectful, perhaps too
respectful, of clauses favored by powerful groups and interests. As
Robert Dishman has noted, "... even the most trifling of measures
tends to be accepted uncritically once it is made part of a constitution.
When threatened it will be defended not only by the now vested interests
which favored it in the first place but also by 'the considerable
numbers
4
of persons who distrust all constitutional change. ,, 1
V. THE CONSEQUENCE OF CONVENTIONPHOBIA IN THE STATES

The advance of Conventionphobia at the state level creates two
classes of states: those with the constitutional initiative and those without.
In the latter group, about two thirds of the states (those where the
convention call must be made by the legislature, and those with an
automatic call provision that decline to use it), change in structure or
process must pass through the legislature. Ideas are advanced that favor

47. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER INCHANGING SOCIETIES, 129-130 (1968).
48. Dishman 28 (1968) (quoting FRANK GRAD, THE DRAFTING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
WORKING PAPERS FOP,A MANUAL, 1-19 (1967). On emulation in state constitutions see Dishman,
supra note 38, at 8-9, and Friedman supra note 23, at 115-124, 346-355. On the validity of the
Pandora's Box argument for New York, see Peter J.Galie, A Pandora's Box? Holding A
Constitutional Convention in New York, in New York State Temporary Commission on
Constitutional Revision. EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT Now FOR THE NEW CENTURY, 69-82 (1995).
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those in power. An example is the four year term for governor, now
almost universal. However, ideas that directly challenge legislative power
- for example, term limits or unicameralism - go nowhere.
In the constitutional initiative states, in contrast, big structural
changes are made, bypassing those in power. But they are made in the
wrong way. Propositions are put on the ballot by advocates. Expensive
campaigns are waged. Participation is limited. The vote is up or down.
There is no real deliberation. There is no forum for exchange, no
possibility for modification of proposals to make them more inclusive of
a range of views. There is no consideration of the consequences of a
major change in one part of the state constitution for provisions
elsewhere. In fact, in some states a single subject rule, limits on the
number of amendments on the ballot at any one time, and time limits on
the reconsideration of failed proposals may positively bar dealing with
the interactive effect of a wide-reaching proposal.49
VI.

CURING CONVENTIONPHOBIA

What is needed is a means of constitutional change that can bypass
the legislature but is also deliberative. Several have been tried or
proposed. The field is still wide open, however, for a good deal of
institutional invention.
A.

The Limited Convention.

Limited calls may constrain a convention to consider specific
subjects or alternatively allow general revisions while placing certain
matters off limits. Thus the 1974 Texas convention was authorized to
consider all matters except revision of the state bill of rights. For the
1977 convention in Tennessee, thirteen topics were specified in the call,
including dates for legislative sessions and gubernatorial inauguration,
homestead tax exemptions, school desegregation, and racially mixed
marriages.5"
Voters are more accepting of limited than unlimited convention
calls. In the 1930-1981 period, a time in which almost half of the
unlimited calls were rejected, only two of fifteen limited conventions met
this fate. Most of the results of limited conventions that were held during
49. Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin, PublicDiscontentand the Decline ofDeliberation,68
TEMPLE L. R. 29 (1995).

50. Leslie H. Southwick and C. Victor Welsh, III, Methods of ConstitutionalRevision: Which
Way Mississippi,56 Miss. L. J. 63-67 (1986).
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this period were ratified by voters. t
The limited convention allays the "Pandora's Box" fear, and allows
group support to more easily coalesce around goals for constitutional
change. All constitutional change in Tennessee was blocked between
1870 and 1953, when a limited convention call occurred and eight
amendments were passed. Subsequently there, several additional limited
conventions were successful in advancing constitutional changes. Citing
this example, Albert Sturm wrote in1969, "Limitation of a convention's
authority to specified matters approved by the voters in the call has
enabled some states to accomplish constitutional changes after other
methods have failed."52
As noted, it is precisely because a limited convention might be held
that legislation that seemingly legitimizes such a convention is resisted
in the U.S. Congress. Though a risky course, passage by two-thirds of
the states of identical language petitioning for a convention for a specific
purpose would in fact force a test on the question of the possibility of a
limited national constitutional convention. As noted above, both
reapportionment and the balanced budget movements brought us to the
brink on this question. Russell Chapin has suggested that the states
might take this course for another purpose, to recapture what he regards
as their appropriate role in the federal system.53
In states like New York, where a broadly cast ballot question on a
convention call is specified in the constitution itself, a limited call is
clearly barred. Elsewhere, where the limited convention is now
prevented by custom, practice or judicial decision, changes in interpretation may allow one. At the state level either a constitutional initiative
(where possible) or action by the state legislature seeking a limited
convention might join the question. Amendment of the constitution to
specifically allow for a limited convention by these routes is also
possible.
B.

The IndirectInitiative.

Nine states provide for the indirect initiative. It is used most often

51. Sturm and May, supra note 27, at 122. Sturm, supra note 26, at 56-60. In Rhode Island
in 1951 voters accepted 6 of 8 propositions for constitutional change, and 1955 1 of 3. In Virginia
the results of limited conventions were "proclaimed" by the convention, not put to a vote.
52. Albert L. Sturm, The Modernizing Procedure, in RICHARD LEACH, COMPACTS OF
ANTIQUITY, 99 (1970).
53. Russell Chapin, ReinvigoratingFederalism, 19 THE URBAN LAWYER 523 - 537 (Summer,

1987).
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for statutory rather than constitutional change, but is available for the
latter in Massachusetts and Mississippi.54 This procedure allows
constitutional changes to be proposed for the ballot by petition, but then
gives the legislature time to consider the matter and endorse it, or offer
an alternative, before the referendum vote. Sometimes parallel questions
may be asked of the voters on the same matter, one from the petitioners
and one from the legislature. If both pass, the one with the most votes
or largest majority is effected. In Alaska an action substantially similar
to that sought by the initiative may forestall the referendum entirely.55
In states where both the direct and indirect initiative exist, petitioners have preferred going around rather than through the legislature. Often
they are hostile to the legislature, or believe it has already proved itself
unresponsive to their priorities. Direct ballot access leaves control of the
question asked of the voters to them and preserves the "purity" of their
effort. The Massachusetts legislature has used parliamentary legerdemain
to compromise the constitutional indirect initiative procedure there.
California abandoned the option in 1966 for want of use.
C. The ConstitutionalCommission With Direct Ballot Access.
The Florida constitution has provided since 1968 for the creation of
a constitutional revision commission at twenty year intervals to review
the document with powers to directly recommend changes to the people
of the state. The first such commission met in 1977-78, conducted a very
wide-reaching and public process, but nevertheless saw its recommendations rejected at the polls. The voters, however, later refused to endorse
a legislative proposal to abolish the commission.
A Tax and Budget Reform Commission with similar powers, but
limited in the scope of its authority, was established in Florida in 1988.
It had its recommendations on budget reform accepted in the election of
1992. A new Florida revision commission will be convened under the
authority of the 1968 constitutional provision in 1997, and background
work has begun for it.56
D. The Statutory Standing Constitutional Commission.
Since 1969 Utah has employed a bipartisan standing constitutional
54. Kehler and Stem, supra note 30, at 294.
55. Gais and Benjamin, supra note 49, at 1309.
56. Robert F. Williams, The Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional
Change, in Benjamin, ed., supra note 29, at 78.
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revision commission comprised of three appointees of the governor, three
legislators from each house appointed by the leaders, and six members
appointed by these nine. Its membership is prestigious and well rooted
in the political branches; the commission's existence provides a
continuing focus in the state on constitutional issues. It lacks constitutional status, however, and must report through the legislature. Nevertheless, it has had considerable success in advancing ideas for constitutional
change. Between 1970 and 1994 twelve constitutional amendments
reviewed or developed by the commission, many of them described as
major, were adopted in the state. 17
E.

Action Panels.

The New York State Constitutional Revision Commission recently
called for four action panels to deal with critical governmental concerns
in the state: fiscal integrity, education, state/local relations and public
safety. The design of panels drew upon the model of the base closing
commissions and the social security commission at the federal level.
Members of high prestige and reputation were to be appointed by the
governor and legislative leaders. Methods for broad consultation were to
be specified in law. The elected state leaders were to commit to
consideration of panel recommendations by a deadline specified in
advance, in law. 8
The action panel idea was a way of focusing on key areas of action,
of interest to the citizens of the state, while avoiding the risks that many
New Yorkers thought were embedded in an unlimited constitutional
convention. The pending mandatory vote on a constitutional convention
question in 1997 was seen as an incentive that might induce the governor
and legislative leaders to act on this proposal.
Limited action panels appointed by the state's top elected officials
for specific purposes, the commission reasoned, would have greater
appeal for them than an unlimited convention, and might be seen as a
way of forestalling a "yes" vote on the convention question. The
commission expected that the action panels, if created, would propose
packages of statutory and constitutional changes. It endorsed a "yes" vote
on the convention question, however, if the state's top elected leaders
took no action to address key problem areas in the state.

57.
58.

UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
THE TEMPORARY NEW YoRK STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (The

Goldmark Commission), EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT Now FOR A NEW CENTURY, (1995).
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Building Deliberation into the Initiative Process.

Qualifying constitutional initiatives for the ballot through a petition
process simply aggregates individual actions, and involves no two-way
communication. In a recent paper we argued that deliberation might be
added to the initiative process by relying on open community or other
institutional meetings to qualify initiatives. Within a general framework
of simple rules, "These meetings could be sponsored by any institution,
public or private ... ." We also suggest the possible use of formal
meetings of local government bodies to vote on ballot initiatives.
"Instead of applying the analogy of candidate voting to initiative and
referenda, perhaps we should instead apply the analogy of legislative
voting, with meetings, time for debate, and public rather than secret
votes." 59

VII.

CONCLUSION - STRIKING MORE THAN ONE BALANCE

In a democracy the people rule. Through elections to representative
institutions they hold accountable those they choose to govern. But what
if this system of accountability through elections fails to work?
Candidate elections reach only those governing, not the system within
which they function. For system change, effective means of constitutional
amendment are needed.
When citizens become deeply discontented with their government
(not their governors), and have no thoughtful, intelligent deliberative
means to alter it, negative consequences are likely. They may withdraw
their support, by increments denying the government the legitimacy it
needs to continue functioning effectively. Or, where the processes of
direct democracy are available, they may use these to alter fundamentals
of government in ways that are immediately appealing but fail to
consider the range of views in the polity or anticipate potential damaging
consequences as the effects of change ripple through the system.
Donald Lutz has recently argued that a real commitment to
constitutionalism is reflected in amending processes that incorporate
popular sovereignty, provide a highly deliberative decision-making
environment and include a distinction between statutory and constitution-

59. Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline ofDeliberation,68
TEMPLE L. R. 29 (1995).
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al provisions. 6 This essay suggests the need to add an additional
criterion, one known to the founders of the union and state constitution
writers: a good amending process does not rely on the altruism of
potential beneficiaries ( for example, legislators) of a perceived flaw in
a polity's governing arrangements to produce a remedy.
Balance is needed: between ease and difficulty, to allow change
while preserving continuity; and between "how" a constitution is
amended and "who" does the amending, to allow deliberation while
preserving legitimacy. At both the national and state levels striking both
balances has often eluded us. We need to get to work.

60. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in G. ALAN TARR (ed.),
CONSTITUTIONAL POLMCS IN THE STATES, (1996).

